The Fight Against Boko Haram Uprising and Effect on National Security: Implications for Socioeconomic Development

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
	Purpose: Boko Haram (BH) originated around 2002 as a local Islamic movement primarily for preaching and charity to locals in Maiduguri, Borno State. Their operations were altered in 2009 following a crackdown on its adherents by the Nigerian government, as a result of which spiritual and political head Muhammad Yusuf was assassinated. More than 38,000 individuals were killed by the Boko Haram conflict between 2009 and 2023. This study aims to assess the dangers posed by the BH uprisings on Nigeria's security, which is affecting other socioeconomic dynamics, to suggest potential solutions to the uprising in Nigeria. **Methodology:** This study used a qualitative research approach. A structured questionnaire was utilized for data collection. Nigerian security personnel make up the study's target group. The participants were contacted based on convenience sampling. Data analysis was achieved using theme analysis.
	Findings: The BH has increased its attacks against security forces and their formations, key government and private institutions, schools, worship centers (such as Churches and Mosques), and the general public, which includes girl-children and mothers. Their menace is eroding Nigeria's existence as a single sovereign political territory. The survey indicated that poverty and religious misunderstanding were the main reasons for establishing Boko Haram. It was suggested that the Nigerian government should address the cause by reducing poverty, creating jobs, and strengthening security operations. **Originality/value:** Poverty and religious misunderstanding were the main reasons for establishing Boko Haram. Cities, towns, villages, and human settlements in northeast Nigeria are not safe, not inclusive, not resilient, and a challenge to sustainability.

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1. Introduction

Boko Haram's true name, according to Murtada (2013), was Jama'atuAhlis Sunna Lid da'awati Wal-Jihad (congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad). The term Boko Haram (BH) means "forbidden western education" [1] . In the early 2000s, the organization began as a tiny Sunni Islamic group demanding a rigorous interpretation and enforcement of Islamic law in Nigeria. Initially, the sect's leadership did not advocate for violence; but, throughout its formative years, its adherents participated in sporadic conflicts with security [2] [3] . Nigerians are becoming increasingly sceptical about the sect's true nature and motivation.

Many Muslims see it as a continuation of the Maitatsine sect, which was founded in 1945 to bring chaos to Islam, even though Maitatsine was not a Muslim until his death, while a reasonable number of Christians see it as an attempt to Islamize Nigerians, with some being apathetic [4] . Religious extremism has always ended in societal slaughter. People will go to any length to defend their religious beliefs, resulting in confrontations in the past. Extremist groups have the power to intimidate individuals.

The 'holy war' led by Usman Dan Fodio in 1804 in Nigeria was an example of religious fanaticism at the time [5] . This conflict encouraged the creation of BH and led to several smaller religious conflicts throughout time. The international community claims that BH started as a non-profit before turning into a terrorist group. Following government attacks on the group's members in some significant northern Nigerian cities in 2009, which sparked five days of violent clashes between the group's members and Nigerian forces and resulted in the deaths of Muhammad Yusuf, the sect's leader, and over 700 other people in Maiduguri, Boko Haram's activities had changed from a local peace militia to a violent organization [2] .

The sect argues that its creator sent them to rid society of Western education and intrusion. BH has carried out several brutal attacks throughout the country, particularly in the north, since its violent debut in 2009. Violence perpetrated by BH against civilian and military targets has also resulted in mass atrocities in northern Nigeria. Their tactics include killings, suicide bombings, abductions, torture, rape, forced marriages and the recruitment of child soldiers, as well as attacks that are directed against government infrastructure, traditional and religious leaders and civilians.

According to Ilugbami and Adeniran (2023) and Doris (2023) it was stated in the report of Statista that the most affected by BH's deadly attacks in Nigeria from 2011 to 2023 are Borno state with a record of 38,255 deaths, Zamfara state with a record of 6,803 deaths, Kaduna state with a record of 6,195 deaths, Benue state with a record of 4,391 deaths, Adamawa state with a record of 4,127, Plateau with a record of 3,768, and Yobe state with a record of 3,229 [6] [7] . Doris (2023) observed that between 2011 and 2023, Boko Haram was responsible for thousands of deaths in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Nigeria is the country most affected by the terrorist group's attacks. States in the Northeast register the highest number of deaths. Borno is by far the most threatened state, in that Boko Haram has caused over 38,000 deaths in this region [7] .

Among the news on attacks mostly present in the media, the kidnapping of 276 female students from a secondary school in Borno in 2014 received a global response. As of April 2021, over 100 girls were still missing, while six students were believed to have died. This study assessed the dangers posed by the BH uprisings on Nigeria's security which is affecting other socioeconomic dynamics, as well as potential solutions to the uprising in Nigeria.

Research question

What are the dynamics employed for the fight against Boko Haram uprising, and its effect on national security?

2. Literature Review

Genesis of Boko Haram

There are several competing hypotheses for how BH formed in northern Nigeria. Although this sub-section dwells on the idea that the sect (Boko Haram) originated as a humanitarian organization, it also briefly discusses the political conspiracy myths, among many others. The political plot is one of the various theories surrounding BH's debut [8] . Some have claimed that the organisation was founded by politicians opposed to former President Goodluck Jonathan's reign.

Certain northern leaders, according to these theories, supported the development of the BH group in the country's north to undermine President Jonathan's administration [9] . Jonathan took over as president when former President Yar'Adua died unexpectedly in 2010 until he was democratically elected in 2011. Given the nation's ethnic and religious characteristics and Jonathan's status as a Christian and a Southerner, northern parliamentarians were said to be opposed to his leadership since they saw country governance as their birthright [8] .

To terrorize the populace, they organized with certain youngsters and funded them while politicians frequently used the assaults as evidence of President Jonathan's incompetence [10] . As a result of the group's growth, they have become challenging to beat. This argument would have been true if BH had started its rebellion in 2010, the year President Jonathan took office; however, the sect has existed since 2002, predating the presidency of former President Jonathan. According to another theory, Jonathan funded BH either to enlist the aid of Christians and people from the South or to ensure that the sect's insurrection undermined and depopulated the northern half of the country in advance of the 2015 elections [8] .

According to this story, Jonathan financed BH to demonize Islam and ensure that fewer people would live in the north by the time the 2015 elections were held. This is because voters from the North generally cast large numbers of ballots and favour candidates from the North. So, if their number had decreased at that point, President Jonathan stood a better chance of defeating Buhari, a northerner, than Buhari did. Being defeated by Buhari with 2.5 million votes in the 2015 election indicates that neither Jonathan's government nor his electoral performance benefited from the BH rebellion [11] .

Because some of BH's militants target other Muslims, it is noteworthy that the group has not been able to demonize Islam. Because they are assaulting people from all racial and religious backgrounds, one wonders what their true motivations may be. Unfortunately, the aforementioned explanations do not fit either the period of the formation of BH or its operations. It was challenging to state or apply the assertions to this study since there was insufficient data to back them up. As a result, this study defends the genesis of BH from a historical viewpoint.

In the northern region of Nigeria, BH was first founded as a non-profit organization [12] . The group's mission was to disseminate Islamic beliefs while arming the populace, particularly those who attended their sermons. However, with time, it transformed into a violent organization that claimed that Islamic culture was the best religion and that everyone should adopt it [13] . Additionally, the organization thinks that Western education is sinful and ought to be banned from the nation.

In the past, BH was known as Yusuffiya, after its founder Mohammed Yusuf. Borno State was established in 1992, but it wasn't until 2001 that it gained popularity. Yusuf, the leader of BH, belonged to a group named the Izalatulbidi'awaikamatulsunna in the 1990s. Yusuf was regarded as one of the group's zealots. He had urged that they go on a jihad to kill all the "unholy" individuals, but the group rejected his idea [14] .

To develop what is now known as the BH organization, he orchestrated secession from the organisation, taking with him others who shared his ideas. Given that the sect's founder was an extremist who desired to carry out a jihad in the northern portion of Nigeria, it is debatable if the cult ever had violent objectives, even though it began as a charitable, peaceful organization. It is also plausible to infer that the introduction of its charitable arms was a tactic for gathering supporters before the launch of its deadly objectives. Yusuf targeted youngsters who were socially marginalized, unemployed, and disadvantaged in society after leaving the Izalatulbidi'awaikamatulsunnasect because he believed they were simpler to indoctrinate and influence [12] .

The organization was able to take advantage of northern Nigeria's socioeconomic deficit. It is significant to highlight that there is a significant economic divide between the southern and northern areas of the nation, with a 27% poverty gap between them in 2018 [15] . Due to their exceptionally low levels of education and unemployment, the jihadist organization was able to take advantage of this and attract young people [16] . Thus, joining the gang represented to them a means of escaping unemployment and poverty.

The gang, formerly known as Yusuffiyato ahalulsunnahwaljamahijirah, changed its name, withdrew from society, went underground, where it trained, and carried out small-scale, insignificant assaults on nearby police stations. Additionally, it established a base in Yobe State's Kannamma village. The group was not yet well-known on a national scale; it was just well-known in the hamlet, and it wasn't viewed as a danger at the time [14] . However, this progressively altered as the group's circumstances began to improve in 2002. The group started aggressively launching operations against the populace in 2002 after changing its name to BH, which means "Western education is forbidden" [16] .

Additionally, "western education" conjures up memories of how the colonial overlords divided the northerners via the use of education. It resulted in hostility and mistrust between traditionally educated commoners and Western-trained elites since the aristocratic class was given access to it while the lower classes were barred [17] . The organization took advantage of the mistrust and division, as shown in its rise, which targets individuals who work in the privileged sector of Western education. The advent of the Western education system in Nigeria, according to Maza et al. (2020), resulted in the "upgrading" and/or move away from the country's essential principles, to a more globalized knowledge system [13] .

However, Yusuf saw this as a "sin" because of the social separation it brought about. Due to the British administration, western-style education gave individuals the chance to become informed and less susceptible to manipulation. This meant that the jihadist organization would not be able to create a strict Islamic environment in the area. With the few recruits it had, the gang began openly attacking police stations and government facilities in December 2003 while continuing to wreak havoc on small villages in Yobe state, including Yunusari, Borsari, Damaturu, Tarmuwa, and Geidam [16, 17] .

The organization went into hiding when the government had to step in because its violent deeds had become intolerable, only to emerge in 2005 much more vengeful and angry. The gang continued to conduct small-scale assaults against the populace between 2005 and 2009. The 2009 assaults, however,

signalled a significant turning point for the organization. After the jihadist organization emerged from hiding and its founder Yusuf returned from a self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia, BH and the Nigerian security forces first engaged in combat in 2009 [18] [16] .

Due to the organization's continuous petty attacks against the government, the police were called in to deal with the group. This confrontation resulted in a fatal conflict that resulted in Yusuf's arrest in 2009 and his death in 2010 [19] [18] [16] . The gang, which had been greatly outraged by Yusuf's passing, retreated to gather its strength and rebuild before returning in 2010. After Yusuf was killed, the police displayed his body on national television, and the government openly declared victory over the jihadist organization without realizing that it was reorganizing to return worse than before.

Theoretical Approach

The Boko Haram (BH) uprising was examined in this study as it is underpinned by Poverty Theory. This theory will be used to critically explain the various dynamics of threats caused by BH and their effects on the poverty level in Nigeria.

One of the main causes of the BH rebellion in Nigeria may be attributed to poverty, according to the Poverty Theory. Insurgents typically gain members by claiming their fight is for the people and that, if supported, they would provide necessities for the general population, in accordance to [20] [21] . Successful recruitment depends on the economic and poverty level in the area. The uprising may be successful if a society is impoverished, illiterate, incompetent, corrupt, and discriminatory to modernisation [22] and globalization, which cause artificial poverty in many developing nations and make them targets for terrorist recruiting.

Liolio (2013) continued, "it is important to know that the fundamental causes of the uprising frequently relate to a protracted cloud of issues culminating in unchecked grievances and exploding violence". Due to such socioeconomic and political issues as racial discrimination, societal prejudice, religious intolerance, unequal resource distribution, or simply a lack of resources, uprisings are more common in developing nations or those with corrupt governments [20] .

Olojo (2013) asserts that economic hardship is another important aspect that has fuelled the desire for violent extremism, recruitment, and support for BH. Many academics thought that the youth's decision to join the group was influenced by the poverty and enduring economic inequities in the nation's northeast [23] . Similarly, Adesoji (2010) emphasizes that the marginalization and unequal distribution or use of resources in Nigeria led certain radicalized professors to preach against the government and democratic environment, which subsequently gave rise to the current BH insurrection [24] .

The Poverty Theory explained further that domestically, times of economic decline, social integration, or state collapse are more prone to see the politicization of religious traditions and the radicalization of religious groups. People who are disenfranchised, hopeless, or physically threatened resort to religion in pursuit of an alternative political system that will satisfy their needs for security, recognition, and welfare [25] . Several violent revolutions are happening right now all around the world, some of which have developed into full-fledged terrorist groups like BH [26, 27] . According to the hypothesis, socioeconomic issues play a significant role in understanding religious uprisings like Boko Haram.

Nigeria, a nation of more than 160 million people, roughly 330 ethnic groups, more than 250 languages, 50% Muslims, 40% Christians, and 10% practising traditional beliefs, was also in very bad condition. Many observers and researchers believe that poverty is at the heart of northern Nigeria's ethno-religious

dilemma, which includes the BH insurrection. 90% of Nigerians now live in persistent poverty as a result of the collapse of infrastructural development.

Despite its cultural richness and abundance of natural and human resources, the nation was placed 153rd out of 177 weak economies among the Committee of Nations in the Human Development Index (2008) [28] [29] . When compared to the southwest and southeast zones, which have relative poverty rates of 67.0% and 59.1%, respectively, Northern Nigeria in particular has the greatest percentage. According to [30] , the northeast and northwest zones have the highest relative poverty rates at 76.3% and 77.7%, respectively.

In addition, despite the country's abundance of natural resources and people's labour, the unemployment rate has remained high. Nigeria as a nation is in grave danger because unemployment has grown to be a significant issue plaguing the lives of Nigerian youngsters [31] . In addition, 1.6 million Nigerian youth are underemployed, leaving 64 million jobless. Dejection, despair, desperation, and dependence on family and friends are all effects of unemployment. The kids are trapped in a circle of chronic poverty due to their reliance, which daily undermines their hope for a promising future. In this scenario, the insurgents' main focus is on the majority of these jobless young people [31] .

Additionally, the International Fund for Agricultural Development noted that "despite Nigeria's abundant natural resources and oil wealth, poverty is widespread to the point that the nation is ranked one of the 20 poorest countries in the world" [32] . According to Hansen (2017), over 70% of the population is considered poor, with 35% of people living in absolute poverty [10] .

Blanchard (2014) claims that understanding the allure of BH among certain northern Nigerians involves an understanding of the region's fundamental development issues, where high rates of poverty and unemployment are made worse by rapid population growth and low levels of literacy. These elements, together with poor administration, extensive corruption, and poor public service delivery, have led to the pervasive discontent that some believe may help BH attract new members [2] .

A nation with a history of economic stagnation, a greater rate of unemployment, and uneven economic development is a favourable environment for the growth of terrorism [33] . Additionally, malicious groups may utilize the complaints of people and groups such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, prejudice, and economic marginalization as recruiting tools for terrorist attacks. This explains how the region's economic misery makes it simple for extremist groups to attract young people from economically disadvantaged backgrounds [33] .

Boko Haram primarily targeted the region's rising percentage of economically disadvantaged young unemployed when it was looking to recruit new members. According to some academics, there is a tangled and indirect link between terrorism, illiteracy, and poverty. These ties were strengthened by the enormous number of young people living on the periphery of Nigerian society [23] . In 2013, the federal authorities freed several BH inmates, primarily spouses and kids of sect members. Several of the kids admitted to selling kegs of fuel to BH for 5,000 naira, which they used to torch Maiduguri schools and other facilities.

These demonstrate how, for more than a decade, the government failed to offer economic opportunity and education in the region, resulting in the residents of the area living in abject poverty. These socioeconomic issues had a role in the rise of BH violence in northern Nigeria. According to the idea, wars typically originate from escalating economic, social, and political disparities inside countries as well as those between them [31] .

According to Olojo (2013), grievances from people and groups, such as those related to poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, prejudice, and economic marginalization, may be utilized as recruiting tools by evil organizations to gather support for their violent terrorism. The Majority-Muslim region of northern Nigeria offers the group a consistent source of recruits; the impoverished youths and Almajiris are eager to join any movement in search of an alternative to the country's existing economic and political inequalities; they believe that the sect's brand of radical Salafism is the solution to their problems [23] .

Economic response to fight against the Boko Haram uprising

According to Iyekekpolo (2020), Boko Haram's sporadic but persistent attacks on civilians have raised tensions and put the nation's security at risk. The government attempted to stop BH's expansion to solve the problems. The measures, however, have not been able to subdue or eliminate the terrorist organization. The government has experimented with the following throughout time to subdue and/or manage the jihadist group: reallocating funds for military improvements, engaging in negotiations and emphasizing states of emergency, requesting foreign aid, and going to war [34] . The government's first attempt to put a stop to the BH uprising was to promote discussion, but this failed [35] .

During the administration of the former President (Goodluck Jonathan), the headship of the sect was called and requested a time to meet for proper discussions. Jonathan even vowed to grant everyone in BH amnesty if they voluntarily gave up their weapons [35] . Because dealing with terrorists has never been a smart idea, government action was always expected to fail. A decision to give up the weaponry in the instance of BH, however, would have been more difficult given the group's various identities and apparent ease in changing its leadership.

That would have made "rapprochement elusive," in the words of Akinbi (2015) [35] . The Nigerian government started additional, harsh actions because the discussion was never successful. From 2012 to the end of 2013, the government opted to declare a state of emergency since the discussion had never been successful for them [2, 35] . At the beginning of 2012, Borno was placed under a state of emergency while President Jonathan was still in office. In 2013, it was expanded to the states of Adamawa and Yobe.

The declaration of a state of emergency was made to contain and/or lessen the effects of the terrorist organization on the populace. That did not matter, though, as the group proceeded to assault others in the area, resulting in further casualties. The Nigerian government has also boosted its financial investments in the fight against the extremist organization. The military was able to acquire additional guns, armoured vehicles, and other essential anti-terrorist supplies in 2014 because of the government's increased spending on the national military budget [13] .

The surge in funding was motivated by the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls by BH. The group's willingness to terrorize the populace at whatever cost was made clear to the authorities. Additionally, the kidnappings' global publicity compelled the government to step up its participation. Sadly, despite receiving more military money, the national security force was still unable to confront the terrorist organization. Due to the misappropriation of funding, the military still had no hope against BH. More than 50% of the funds earmarked for the national security force were not accounted for, and political figures in possession of the finances preferred to utilize it for their purposes rather than supporting the purchase of the necessary weaponry [10, 13] .

Due to this, the government has struggled to put an end to the terrorist organization and many troops have died while battling BH. Ogunnubi (2019) contends that the Nigerian government has achieved considerable success in the war against BH despite concerns about financial misappropriation. In addition to hiring over a hundred additional persons for the national security force, the government also authorized a budget of over one million US dollars (USD) for the development of the national defence system in 2018 [26] . The government recognized a further need for increased funding for the war against BH following the kidnapping of schoolgirls in Dapchi. As the sect is more armed than the security forces, military soldiers tasked to battle the jihadist group have also stated that they are no match for the group. Even with all the foreign aid that has been entering the country in the ten years since the organization's violent debut in 2008, the Nigerian security forces have not been able to acquire the military equipment and develop the techniques needed to confront the jihadist group.

The Nigerian government has also been successful in soliciting outside aid in response to the BH rebellion. Following the widely publicized Chibok tragedy, the US also got involved in the situation through the United Nations (UN) [36] . To assist in educating Nigeria's military on counterterrorism operations, the US donated specialists to the Nigerian government. Additionally, the US was able to give the government financial support to improve its technology capabilities and appropriately support the soldiers against the terrorist organization [16] [37] .

It was believed that the troops' failure to fight efficiently was brought on by a lack of proper care, which was interfering with their stability and focus. The US's involvement provided the Nigerian people some reason for hope, but the jihadist group seemed to be better prepared because their uprising did not lessen or come to a stop as a result of US counterterrorism assistance. According to Ayegba (2015), BH has well-developed cognitive and behavioural processes. As a result, rather than collecting cutting-edge weaponry, the only way to defeat it is by understanding how it thinks [36] .

Their claim was supported by the fact that the terrorist organization was actively readjusting its strategy as the US was aiding the Nigerian government in doing so. To decentralize the system and facilitate its attacks, BH was building its networks and planning ways to disrupt the nation's communication infrastructure [6] . This was seen in their subsequent bombings and attempted assassinations of police stations, retail stores, and government buildings, notably in the Kano assault in 2014.

The governments of Chad, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger also decided to join the US in the war against BH since the terrorist organization was expanding into their borders [38] . Over 3000 military men were dispatched to Nigeria to combat the terrorist organization as part of their contribution to the effort. Additionally, the displaced individuals impacted by the rebellion were housed in the territory of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger [39] . The revolt has caused more than 100,000 people to be displaced, which has increased the number of refugees leaving the nation. The spread of BH was a result of the flow of migrants into those nations; some of its members entered those areas pretending to be refugees to assault and disrupt the refugee camps. As a result, the Cameroonian government has decided to send some refugees back to Nigeria.

The UK also contributed to the effort to support the Nigerian government in its struggle against the BH rebellion. The enhancement of troops' abilities and counterterrorism training received financial backing from the UK government in 2017 [38] [40] . It provided financial assistance of more than $250 million and dispatched 40 British troops to fight alongside the Nigerian military against BH [38] [41] . China supplied technology assistance, and Canada contributed specialists [6] [29] [38] . These nations were among those that offered assistance.

The Nigerian government has benefited from international aid in the conflict with BH. Although the gang has not been vanquished, it has given the Nigerian authorities cause for optimism. The Nigerian government has also used military operations to counter the BH insurrection [42] . The primary response of the government to BH is to wage war on the organization. The government has always employed military tactics to combat the organization, even before it started acting violently in 2009 [35] [16] [40] .

The Nigerian military has constantly been dispatched to battle the Islamist organization during the Jonathan government. The organization engaged in combat with Nigerian military soldiers in 2009, which resulted in the deaths of over one hundred BH militants and the capture of the sect's leader, Yusuf [12] . The government believed it had vanquished the jihadist organization thanks to that specific military operation, but the jihadists were just angry and more determined as a result. Following the election of Muhammadu Buhari, the military's headquarters were transferred from Abuja to Maiduguri, and new military leadership was appointed.

These small-scale military operations were conducted by the Nigerian security forces against BH in 2015 [43] . This was done to increase the military's effectiveness in its conflict with the terrorist organization. Additionally, because Sambisa woodland is home to BH's headquarters of operations, the Nigerian military has engaged them in battle there, multiple times. The terrorist organization was struck by the Nigerian Air Force in April 2019 in the Borno state forest's Bula Korege region. The attack allegedly occurred when the jihadist organization was conducting a conference in the woodland. Over a hundred members of the organization were killed in the raid, according to the attack's top commander, and several of the sect's vehicles and weaponry were also destroyed [44] .

This was comparable to the Nigerian security forces' 2016 military operation in the Sambisa forest, which also resulted in the murder of BH fighters there. Finally, on June 10, 2019, Colonel Sagir Musa, the army's director of public relations, presented a report revealing the deaths of nine BH social media influencers [45] [46] .

According to the head, the sect's media managers were in charge of using the platform to bring in new members and spread the group's beliefs. They were detained by the army. Even while the Nigerian security forces saw this as a success, it is fair to question the significance of the members' deaths. This is because the Nigerian government has a history of inflating the significance and effectiveness of its responses to the BH uprising. In a nutshell, the Nigerian government has been unable to put an end to BH's uprising there despite making notable progress in the fight against it. With the assistance of other countries, the government has been able to stop the terrorist group from seizing total control of Nigeria's northern area.

The reactions of the government to the rise of BH have included raising the military budget, asking for communication with the terrorist organization, announcing states of emergency, soliciting foreign support, and sending troops on military operations. At the beginning of his first tenure as president (2015-2018), the current president, Muhammadu Buhari, made it clear that fighting BH was a key component of his mission. He didn't fulfil his pledge, though. The terrorist organization is gaining momentum in the nation and spreading to other nations like Chad and Cameroon because the government has paid little or no attention to its recent resurgence.

Conceptual Framework

The research attempted to create a link between the study's variables based on the theories of constructivism, Islamic thought, and poverty. The association between Boko Haram, poverty, illiteracy, and misperceptions of religion is depicted in Figure 2.1 below.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework - Adapted and modified from [47]

The correlation between the dependent and independent variables is depicted in Figure 1. BH is an independent variable, while the Security system of Nigeria is a dependent variable. According to the figure above, the independent variable was caused by major variables such as poverty, illiteracy, and misconceptions about religion. In the view of Olojo (2013), economic hardship is one important element that has fuelled the desire for violent extremism, recruitment, and support for BH. Additionally, the 2012 National Bureau of Statistics report illustrates the degree of poverty in the region [23] .

The greater statistic of 77.7% relative poverty is seen in the Northeast of the nation, where Boko Haram is active. To mobilize support and attract new members for terrorist attacks, the organization leveraged personal problems including poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy. According to Adesoji (2010), marginalization and unequal resource allocation are the main causes of poverty in Nigeria, which made it easier for the group to attract new members [24] .

Additionally, the inability of Nigerian leaders to implement economic policies that will raise people's standards of living and create employment opportunities for young people has resulted in youth unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, which has led to a variety of intercommunal, interethnic, interreligious, and interclass conflicts that have come to characterize the nation and contributed to the rise of BH.

3. Methodology

This qualitative study examined the fight against Boko Haram uprising and it effect on national security using the case study of high officers in the security. Qualitative research method is suitable for open-ended questions whereby respondents were asked to fill in their perceptions, and for research that does not need hypothesis testing [48] . Finding, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within the data gathered for the research is referred to as a qualitative analytic approach [49] .

For unknown or large population, Zikmund and Babin (2003) derived the formula for sample size by adopting different error tolerances [50] . Thus, the generally accepted was 95%.

Sample size formula is n $= \frac{Z^2}{4E^2}$

n is the sample, Z is the confidence interval Z score (0.95), and E is the error term (0.05).

The sample size equals 400. To reduce the sample size to a sizable number that can be used for qualitative study, 5% of the sample size will be equals 20. Hence, this study elicits information from 20 respondents, and was used for data analysis.

A structured questionnaire was utilized as the tool for data collection in this investigation. Nigerian security personnel make up the study's target group. The participants were contacted based on purposive sampling [which is non-probabilistic] because of the high uncertainty that 400 high-rank security experts will be available to respond to the questions. It is also justified because it was targeted at security organizations' staff members who were actively engaged in the wars against BH. Also, the study was qualitative in nature, hence the need to use small sample size. According to Saunders *et al*. (2015), it is a type of non-probability sampling that involves the sample being drawn from part of the population that is close to hand or easy to reach [51] . Data analysis was achieved using theme analysis, which Braun and Clarke (2006) observed as most suitable for organizing and characterizing qualitative data [49] . Data collection took place between March, 2023 and July, 2023.

4. Findings

The study found that all the security organizations' staff members were actively engaged in the wars against rebels, thus the qualitative data were reliable for this type of study.

Demographic information of the respondents

From the information gathered, the first section of the survey (demographic section) showed that the respondents were officers in the Department of State Service (DSS) with the ranks of Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO) and Police Officers with the ranks of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP). Furthermore, there were Army personnel with the ranks of Lieutenant and inspectors from the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). This implies that the study is rich and beneficial by having various respondents across various security organizations who are also involved in the fights against BH uprisings with different strategies, tactics, formations, and operational modes.

The information further revealed the gender, highest level of education attained and the religion they believed in. It was revealed that sixteen participants were male while four were female. All the participants were holder of Bachelors' degree and Higher National Diploma (HND), and nine participants were holder of Masters' degree, and twelve participants were Islam faithful while eight participants were Christian faithful. This implies that since the topic focused on issues concerning Islam, the perception of Islam faithful will dominate in the information obtained.

Treats of Boko Haram uprising on security in Nigeria

The rise of assaults, bombing attacks, and direct attacks on public buildings, institutions and security formations, is unlike anything seen in previous ethnic and religious conflicts. The query indicated that BH has challenged the possession of firearms and other ballistics. According to the report, BH terrorists possessed equipment that was better used by the country's security forces.

The rest of the evidence demonstrated how challenging it is to get timely, accurate information and security inputs that can help security agencies defeat the BH uprising. Overall, respondents agreed that BH has made it challenging to provide effective security because of the organization's high level of

internal corruption, its use of subpar and out-of-date weapons, logistical obstacles, and a host of other security-related concerns.

The respondent further asserted that BH's influence on Nigeria's security systems has been substantial. 90% of participants said that BH was mostly unknown to the Nigerian populace. As a result, these guys are in significant danger due to the targeting of security officers in their personal lives. The attitude and morale of security personnel in openly facing the enemies has also degraded. This proof has caused more of them to escape, resign from their positions, or engage in rebellion. As a result, the Nigerian military leadership executed around 200 soldiers and relieved about 300 others of their duties, which hurt the Nigerian security apparatus.

The study then asked participants how the crisis had impacted Nigeria's security system. The great majority of respondents said that the country's security system had been significantly impacted by the BH uprising. In security organizations, combat operations and tactical and strategic security procedures underwent a full transformation. The security system has been severely weakened by its ability to prevail in the conflict, as some of its members have been reduced to a helpless force without a clear goal or strategy for successfully putting down the revolt.

Recent instances of mutiny, the exodus of Nigerian troops to nearby countries, and the subsequent conviction of several soldiers in a military court martial, where some soldiers were executed or discharged from service, all lend credence to this. The security mechanism has also been made public because it is no longer a secret that it is occasionally overpowered. The public's faith in security problems has been damaged as a result. In a nutshell, given that the majority of the respondents work as security officers, it is clear that they believe that the disagreements have hurt both them individually and their respective security agencies. Only one respondent thinks that the rebellion has had even a very slight and mild impact on security services. This may be connected to a rise in the number of men who still want to join the military.

Their perceptions corroborate the fact that in 2022, the United Nations (UN) verified 524 grave violations against 307 children in north-east Nigeria, including forced recruitment, abductions, killing, maiming and sexual violence. According to a report of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2023), it was revealed that at least 10,000 pregnancies have been terminated since 2013 by the Nigerian military during a secret, systematic and illegal abortion program in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. This is the social effect of the tactics deployed by the sect [52] . This agrees with the study of Adenrele (2012) which examined the poverty and political symptoms of Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria [28] . Also, it agrees with the study of Anyadike (2013) and Ebonyi (2019) which examined the challenges of Boko Haram on national security in Nigeria [53, 54] .

Possible solutions to Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria

The government should upgrade the capabilities of its security organizations by making available recent weapons and ballistics to equip their agents with cutting-edge weapons capable of competing with BH's superior arsenal, according to respondents, to effectively put an end to the uprising. Additionally, sufficient facilities for rewards must be created to maintain the battling spirits of the operators. Next, discuss since some people continue to believe that it is the only practical way to put an end to this uprising.

Many of the insurgents were proven justified and attributed to some of the societal leadership failures of the elected and traditional leaders, and the negligence of the elites in providing sound leadership

doctrine. Some respondents, however, emphasized the importance of starting from scratch to improve people's general conditions, provide employment opportunities, and reduce corruption and injustice. The remarks also stressed the need for the government to apprehend and prosecute anyone suspected of funding BH, since doing so may increase loyalty and commitment on the part of security troops, especially those on the front lines. Security personnel feel that practices like intelligence gathering and community policing might minimize the entering of BH leaders in Nigeria, and as a result, will prevent them from connecting with their networks.

A coalition of international forces may also help them against BH, according to the vast majority of respondents, especially if they can effectively employ new military and security technology. Nigeria's political leaders, particularly the government, ought to help the fight against the uprising more by adopting a non-political international strategy. Few security experts, though, think that a global alliance is always required because it hasn't had much of an impact on the present uprising. Organizations remain the better options since they have the most in-depth understanding of the subject at hand.

Nearly all participants believed that regionally, Nigeria required help from its West African neighbours. The majority of respondents concurred that despite these countries' colonial histories or other differences; the Nigerian government must collaborate and work closely with them to resolve the problem because the BH headquarters are still within their borders, particularly in Cameroon, Chad, and the Niger Republic. However, establishing permanent border patrol teams and exchanging intelligence and logistical information will undoubtedly aid in putting a stop to the BH fight.

5. Conclusion

The shock of the BH uprising on the national prosperity of Nigeria cannot be overstated. This study has exposed the dangers that uprising poses to the country's poverty rate. Boko Haram is known for bloodshed; their continuous bloodshed and instability have interrupted economic activity, displaced countless individuals, and hampered crucial infrastructure development. Given this, poverty rates have risen, aggravating many Nigerians' already severe socioeconomic circumstances. To solve this critical issue, Nigerian authorities and the international community must prioritize both security and long-term socioeconomic solutions. This involves comprehensive methods to combat extremism, enhance education, generate jobs, and promote social harmony. Only via a diversified strategy can Nigeria expect to reduce BH's destructive impact on national development and strive toward a more peaceful and prosperous future.

Additionally, this study looked into various solutions to the uprising of BH in Nigeria. While military actions have been critical in curbing the group's activities, addressing the core causes of the conflict is vital. Sustainable solutions include not only security measures but also attempts to solve governance, poverty, and marginalization challenges. A comprehensive strategy should stress discussion and reconciliation, engage local people, and support development in uprising-affected areas. Furthermore, international engagement and support are critical to effectively combating BH and maintaining Nigeria's long-term peace and prosperity. To summarize, the war against BH is not only an issue of national security but also an important component of Nigeria's larger development strategy.

Future studies can explore the impact of insecurity on the socio-economic development of the region by including Nigeria and other African countries that shares the northern border being terrorized by Boko Haram. This study is limited to the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and its effect on national security, and by extension to socioeconomic development.

Abbreviations

ASP: Assistant Superintendent of Police

BH: Boko Haram

DSS: Department of State Service

NSCDC: Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps

SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals

SIO: Senior Intelligence Officers

UN: United Nations

US: United States

Contributions

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